Before taking office, President-Elect Barack Obama is keeping one promise – sending more troops to Afghanistan while working to reduce American deployment in Iraq. The Pentagon says some 20,000 additional American troops will be deployed to Afghanistan by spring 2009.
News of Obama’s decision was greeted with support. A December 3 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll showed that 55 percent of Americans backed Obama’s plan to withdraw troops from Iraq while 52 percent “favored” the war in Afghanistan.
In the absence of a broader vision, this is not the real change promised.
Though predictable, the public support for continuing the Afghanistan war is troubling. Perhaps Americans believe we dropped the ball in the “good war” we started to break Al Qaeda and capture Osama bin Laden. Instead, we initiated the “bad war” in Iraq, letting Al Qaeda and bin Laden remain at large. The result is a resurgent Taliban, (Some estimate it has a “permanent presence in 72% of the country: see http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE4B70YB20081208),
a growing insurgency among Afghanistan tribes, and an uncontrolled border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 was understandable, though perhaps short-sighted. The response of the incoming Obama administration may be just as short-sighted. Obama’s response thus far is rather limited to holding out the stick.
The result is a new threat from the Taliban issued December 8: An increase of U.S. troops in Afghanistan provides incentive to kill more Americans. (http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD94UI5901).
On December 7 we learned that the additional American troops will be deployed around Kabul. New York Times reporter Kirk Semple said this deployment is “a decision that reflects rising concern among military officers, diplomats and government officials about the increasing vulnerability of the capital and the surrounding area.”
Are American troops sitting ducks?
A glance at a map of Afghanistan points to a volatile area. Iran, Russia, and China, not to mention Pakistan and India, all come together in south-central Asia. If Iran, Russia, and China all fear being surrounded by what they perceive as hostile troops (historically each does), Pakistan is doubly so if you add India to the mix.
Other ingredients making South Asia volatile include heightened tensions between Pakistan and India over the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, continued killing of Pakistani civilians during U.S. military operations, a Pakistani government unable to come to terms with its own military and intelligence services let alone control its own border, and an increasingly corrupt Afghan government unable to deliver basic goods to its citizens.
Clearly, a broader vision is required to reduce the tensions in South Asia. Relying only on additional U.S. troops is not prudent.
There are two basic goals in Afghanistan. First, prevent the use of Afghanistan for training terrorists and mounting terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. This is certainly an immediate and mid-term goal and should be pursued.
Second, provide stability in South Asia, especially considering that Pakistan and India are both nuclear-power states. The too is an immediate but also a long-term goal and certainly should be pursued.
So what should be done?
The first goal is partially military. The U.S., with NATO, can provide Afghanistan enough security while its army and police are trained.
The first goal is also partially political. The Taliban has reportedly severed relations with Al Qaeda (http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghan.saudi.talks/). Talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban, brokered by Saudi Arabia, have gone nowhere yet, but the parties are talking. Under the right circumstances, the Taliban might be persuaded to honor the Afghanistan constitution that does away with most of the strict Islamic restrictions used during its rule in the 1990s. This presents an opportunity for the U.S. (with Saudi Arabia acting as go-between) to explore what it would take to cease the Taliban-sponsored insurgency.
The second goal involves easing the fears of seven countries with interests in South Asia. Currently, there is no political framework in which such fears can be mutually understood and alleviated.
Such a framework could be established through an on-going United Nations’ sponsored Seven-Party Talks similar to the Six-Party Talks that have eased tension in the Korean Peninsula. The seven parties are the United States, Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Iran.
For each country, fear abounds.
The United States sees the potential of Afghanistan becoming a staging ground for terrorists envisioning a new attack on the scale of 9/11.
Afghanistan sees itself being taken over by foreign troops, a brew that historically forced the country’s many tribes to continue fighting.
China fears American and NATO troops seeking a permanent presence in South Asia. As well, China has made considerable investments in South Asia. At stake is a $3.5 billion investment in a cooper mine at Aynak south of Kabul, expansion of the Karakoram Highway linking China with northern Pakistan, construction of access roads in Afghanistan, a north-south energy and trade corridor that envisions oil and gas pipelines running to China’s Xinjiang Province, and up to a reported $13 billion investment in construction and operation of a deep-water port at Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea.
Russia’s main fear is that the United States and NATO plan a permanent military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Talks could provide mechanisms whereby Russia’s legitimate trade and investments in the region would be protected. If necessary, the Seven-Party Talks could ease Russian fears further through cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an inter-governmental security forum founded in 2001 that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
India is concerned about instability in the region and, after the Mumbai attacks, any resurgence of Islamic terrorism.
Iran fears that any American and NATO military presence in Afghanistan would be used to force regime change in Iran.
Pakistan worries greatly about a perceived U.S.-India-Afghan alliance bent on dismembering Pakistan. It is especially suspicious of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement that allows trade of nuclear fuel for peaceful use.
On-going and regular talks would provide a political mechanism that is currently lacking in the region for a host of problems, including bilateral relations. For example, the United States has pledged $750 million for Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. At present, no mechanism exists for delivery of this aid.
The Seven-Party Talks could also provide a mechanism easing tensions between Pakistan and India. As well, they could lead to improved relations between all the parties and Iran, including resolution of Iran’s nuclear arms ambitions.
Some might argue the United States should not negotiate with Iran until it gives up its nuclear weapons ambitions. This was not the case with North Korea: The Six Party Talks concerning its nuclear program continue with full participation of the United States and North Korea.
Seven Party Talks in South Asia would be an ambitious undertaking, but it is a change we can believe in. Military action alone is unworkable. What can work is a road map for ongoing dialog that serves to reduce fears and anxieties among different countries and people. Only with such a real change in our foreign policy can real progress be made.
News of Obama’s decision was greeted with support. A December 3 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll showed that 55 percent of Americans backed Obama’s plan to withdraw troops from Iraq while 52 percent “favored” the war in Afghanistan.
In the absence of a broader vision, this is not the real change promised.
Though predictable, the public support for continuing the Afghanistan war is troubling. Perhaps Americans believe we dropped the ball in the “good war” we started to break Al Qaeda and capture Osama bin Laden. Instead, we initiated the “bad war” in Iraq, letting Al Qaeda and bin Laden remain at large. The result is a resurgent Taliban, (Some estimate it has a “permanent presence in 72% of the country: see http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE4B70YB20081208),
a growing insurgency among Afghanistan tribes, and an uncontrolled border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 was understandable, though perhaps short-sighted. The response of the incoming Obama administration may be just as short-sighted. Obama’s response thus far is rather limited to holding out the stick.
The result is a new threat from the Taliban issued December 8: An increase of U.S. troops in Afghanistan provides incentive to kill more Americans. (http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD94UI5901).
On December 7 we learned that the additional American troops will be deployed around Kabul. New York Times reporter Kirk Semple said this deployment is “a decision that reflects rising concern among military officers, diplomats and government officials about the increasing vulnerability of the capital and the surrounding area.”
Are American troops sitting ducks?
A glance at a map of Afghanistan points to a volatile area. Iran, Russia, and China, not to mention Pakistan and India, all come together in south-central Asia. If Iran, Russia, and China all fear being surrounded by what they perceive as hostile troops (historically each does), Pakistan is doubly so if you add India to the mix.
Other ingredients making South Asia volatile include heightened tensions between Pakistan and India over the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, continued killing of Pakistani civilians during U.S. military operations, a Pakistani government unable to come to terms with its own military and intelligence services let alone control its own border, and an increasingly corrupt Afghan government unable to deliver basic goods to its citizens.
Clearly, a broader vision is required to reduce the tensions in South Asia. Relying only on additional U.S. troops is not prudent.
There are two basic goals in Afghanistan. First, prevent the use of Afghanistan for training terrorists and mounting terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. This is certainly an immediate and mid-term goal and should be pursued.
Second, provide stability in South Asia, especially considering that Pakistan and India are both nuclear-power states. The too is an immediate but also a long-term goal and certainly should be pursued.
So what should be done?
The first goal is partially military. The U.S., with NATO, can provide Afghanistan enough security while its army and police are trained.
The first goal is also partially political. The Taliban has reportedly severed relations with Al Qaeda (http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghan.saudi.talks/). Talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban, brokered by Saudi Arabia, have gone nowhere yet, but the parties are talking. Under the right circumstances, the Taliban might be persuaded to honor the Afghanistan constitution that does away with most of the strict Islamic restrictions used during its rule in the 1990s. This presents an opportunity for the U.S. (with Saudi Arabia acting as go-between) to explore what it would take to cease the Taliban-sponsored insurgency.
The second goal involves easing the fears of seven countries with interests in South Asia. Currently, there is no political framework in which such fears can be mutually understood and alleviated.
Such a framework could be established through an on-going United Nations’ sponsored Seven-Party Talks similar to the Six-Party Talks that have eased tension in the Korean Peninsula. The seven parties are the United States, Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Iran.
For each country, fear abounds.
The United States sees the potential of Afghanistan becoming a staging ground for terrorists envisioning a new attack on the scale of 9/11.
Afghanistan sees itself being taken over by foreign troops, a brew that historically forced the country’s many tribes to continue fighting.
China fears American and NATO troops seeking a permanent presence in South Asia. As well, China has made considerable investments in South Asia. At stake is a $3.5 billion investment in a cooper mine at Aynak south of Kabul, expansion of the Karakoram Highway linking China with northern Pakistan, construction of access roads in Afghanistan, a north-south energy and trade corridor that envisions oil and gas pipelines running to China’s Xinjiang Province, and up to a reported $13 billion investment in construction and operation of a deep-water port at Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea.
Russia’s main fear is that the United States and NATO plan a permanent military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Talks could provide mechanisms whereby Russia’s legitimate trade and investments in the region would be protected. If necessary, the Seven-Party Talks could ease Russian fears further through cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an inter-governmental security forum founded in 2001 that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
India is concerned about instability in the region and, after the Mumbai attacks, any resurgence of Islamic terrorism.
Iran fears that any American and NATO military presence in Afghanistan would be used to force regime change in Iran.
Pakistan worries greatly about a perceived U.S.-India-Afghan alliance bent on dismembering Pakistan. It is especially suspicious of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement that allows trade of nuclear fuel for peaceful use.
On-going and regular talks would provide a political mechanism that is currently lacking in the region for a host of problems, including bilateral relations. For example, the United States has pledged $750 million for Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. At present, no mechanism exists for delivery of this aid.
The Seven-Party Talks could also provide a mechanism easing tensions between Pakistan and India. As well, they could lead to improved relations between all the parties and Iran, including resolution of Iran’s nuclear arms ambitions.
Some might argue the United States should not negotiate with Iran until it gives up its nuclear weapons ambitions. This was not the case with North Korea: The Six Party Talks concerning its nuclear program continue with full participation of the United States and North Korea.
Seven Party Talks in South Asia would be an ambitious undertaking, but it is a change we can believe in. Military action alone is unworkable. What can work is a road map for ongoing dialog that serves to reduce fears and anxieties among different countries and people. Only with such a real change in our foreign policy can real progress be made.
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